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Abstract Death rates for working-age men in European state socialist countries
deviated from general improvements in survival observed in the rest of Europe
during the 20th century. The magnitude of structural labor force changes across
countries correlates with lagged increases in death rates for men in the working
ages. This pattern is consistent with a hypothesis that hyper-development of heavy
industry and stagnation (even contraction) of the service sector created anomic
conditions leading to unhealthy lifestyles and self-destructive behavior among men
moving from primary-sector to secondary-sector occupations. Occupational con-
trasts within countries similarly show concentration of rising male death rates
among blue collar workers. Collapse of state socialist systems produced rapid
corrections in labor force structure after 1990, again correlated with a fading of the
state socialist mortality syndrome in following decades.
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A distinctive mortality trend appeared in Eastern Europe in the second half of the
twentieth century (Cooper and Sempos 1984; Dupaquier 1984; Giersdorf and
Schuler 1984; Bourgeois-Pichat 1985; Jozan 1989). Since it appeared only in state
socialist countries, it aptly may be called the state socialist mortality syndrome
(Valkovics 1984; Okolski 1987; Forster and Jozan 1990; Hoehn and Pollard 1991;
Shkolnikov et al. 1998a). This syndrome had several hallmark features.
Focus on Working-Age Men
First, better public health service delivery throughout eastern Europe improved
infant and child survival almost continuously after 1950.
1 Second, survival of older
adults remained stable or in many cases improved slightly throughout eastern
Europe. This particularly reﬂected expansion of effective public health services and
pension systems. Population coverage and the ratio of retirement income to working
income increased just as rapidly in state socialist countries as in the western
European region (Carlson and Watson 1990).
In contrast to success stories for young and old dependents, survival improve-
ments at working ages (particularly for men) slowed and stopped during the ﬁrst
decade of state socialist rule in eastern Europe.
2 Then death rates for working-age
men began to increase throughout most of the region (Vacek 1969; Madai 1980;
Cooper et al. 1984; Okolski 1985). Figure 1 shows 5Mx central mortality rates for
Hungary over this period, the clearest example of the phenomenon.
For Hungarian men in their forties, 1995 death rates peaked nearly three times
higher than 1960 death rates, before falling back during the decade after the collapse
of state socialist governments to levels observed in the 1980s.
The negative survival trend appeared in every eastern European state socialist
country except perhaps the German Democratic Republic, as shown in Fig. 2 for the
probability of surviving from age 30 to 60 (30p30), ages where the state socialist
mortality syndrome was concentrated. This trend did not appear in other European
countries (Hoehn and Pollard 1991).
1 Most state-socialist countries did introduce a non-standard deﬁnition of live births that produced
underestimates of infant mortality in the range of 15 to 20 percent (Hoehn 1981; Anderson and Silver
1986), but these non-standard practices remained in effect for most of the second half of the century
(Carlson and Tsvetarsky 1994) so trends in infant survival can be assessed despite biases in reported
absolute infant mortality levels. One exception to the favorable overall trend involved temporary
deterioration of infant mortality in the Soviet Union during the 1970s (Anderson and Silver 1989). This
exception resulted from subordination of public health policies to economic development. A Soviet plan
to depopulate hundreds of small villages shifted obstetric/gynecological nurses and polyclinics to
centralized locations (Bernstam and Carlson 1988). Resulting post-neonatal mortality increases
concentrated in these isolated rural areas of the Soviet Union (Velkoff and Miller 1995).
2 This analysis does not examine state socialist countries such as Cuba in other parts of the world,
because the aim here is to examine contrasting paths of development and demographic change within the
European culture area.
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123Figure 2 also shows that the state socialist mortality syndrome began to disappear
in all the former state socialist countries within the ﬁrst decade after the collapse of
state socialist governments around 1990.
Age, Period, or Cohort Effects?
Before considering explanations of the state socialist mortality syndrome based on
contemporaneous social-structural context, we must ask whether long-term cohort
explanations might better account for it. Particularly for Germany but also for other
nations, Horiuchi (1983) pointed out that male cohorts born at the start of the 20th
century experienced unusually high death rates in later life (from ages 45 or 50
onward) while women in the same cohorts did not. Drawing on related research
from Japan (Okubo 1981) he attributed this to a lasting footprint of malnutrition in
adolescence, experienced by these cohorts as they reached the critical years of
puberty during the First World War. Boleslawski (1985) pointed out the existence of
a similar long-term mortality effect for certain cohorts in Poland. Several writers
(Compton 1985; Dinkel 1985; Anderson and Silver 1989) refer to this long-term
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
30 to3 4
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to4 9
50t o5 4
55t o5 9
60 to 64
65 to 69
70 to7 4
75t o 79
80 to 84
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
1985 1990 1995 2000
Fig. 1 Increase in death rates relative to 1960, Hungarian men. Source: Hungarian central mortality rates
for men, 5Mx, from Human Mortality Database (http://www.mortality.org)
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123effect as a possible explanatory factor for rising male death rates in Eastern Europe.
Could the state socialist mortality syndrome have been a more widespread case of
the passage of high-risk cohorts damaged by historical circumstances earlier in life?
The ﬁrst piece of evidence against a cohort explanation comes from age trends in
death rates. In most affected populations death rates increased ﬁrst for men at older
working ages between 45 and 60 during the 1960s and early 1970s (Carlson 1989;
Carlson and Tsvetarsky 1992). Later in the 1970s and during the 1980s the
syndrome moved downward to younger ages, beginning to affect men between ages
30 and 45. This downward shift is the opposite of the age trend that would be
expected if speciﬁc high-risk cohorts were aging through the population over time.
We estimated age, period and cohort effects using logit transformations of 5Mx
values from 1955 to 2005 for Hungarian men between ages 10 and 80, because they
present the most drastic example of the state socialist mortality syndrome.
3
The intrinsic estimator approach to separating age, period and cohort effects has
been shown (Yang et al. 2004, 2008; Yang 2008) to be a more ﬂexible, reliable and
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3 Replication of calculations using cohort rather than period mortality rates do not reveal any signiﬁcant
difference in our results or conclusions.
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123efﬁcient model for estimating these joint effects than more traditional approaches,
such as the constrained general linear model estimator which can produce very
different estimates for different assumed or imposed constraints. The apc_ie
procedure in Stata software identiﬁed row, column and diagonal effects within our
age-by-year matrix of rates. The ‘‘row’’ or age effect averages mortality at each age
across all observed years to produce a familiar typical age curve of mortality (see
Table 1). We estimated age-effect 5Mx rates from bage coefﬁcients produced by the
Stata apc_ie procedure:
5 ^ Mx ¼ e
aþbage ðÞ .
1 þ e aþbage
   : ð1Þ
This age pattern ignores period trends and is based on data from all observed years
considered together. The ‘‘column’’ or period effect averages mortality in each year
across all ages. This average of logits of 5Mx across age groups is roughly
equivalent to Schoen’s (1970) geometric mean of mortality rates as a summary
period measure of mortality. After an initial post-war decade of little change, the
period effect increases dramatically for Hungarian men well into the 1990s, but then
subsides in the post-state-socialist era, as shown in Table 1.
The Stata apc_ie procedure estimates cohort effects net of the effects attributed to
age and period factors. All three vectors of estimated effects appear in Table 1.
However, the estimated cohort effects are problematic for answering our research
question about the state socialist mortality syndrome. Since our matrix of rates is
rectangular in age and year, estimated effects for the most recent cohorts are
affected by progressive truncation of all but the youngest ages observed in the data.
Similarly, we are only able to observe the earliest cohorts at the oldest ages. This
truncation problem means that only the relatively ﬂat middle portion of the cohort
effect curve (where cohorts are observed across all considered ages) allows a
reliable comparison to identify cohort effects. In the middle range where cohorts are
directly comparable in terms of age ranges considered, this inductive approach to
measuring cohort effects does not reveal variations capable of explaining the state
socialist mortality syndrome. No clear cohort trend or deviations rivaling changes in
the period effects appear in this ﬂat middle section of the curve.
Horiuchi’s older approach actually allows a more deductive answer to our
question. Rather than inductively seeking cohort effects everywhere in the age-by-
year matrix of rates, we look for such effects only where theoretically-grounded
deduction tells us they ought to occur. Horiuchi isolated his high mortality cohort
using ratios of age-speciﬁc mortality rates in each year, explaining that ‘‘…if a
cohort experiences a relatively higher mortality schedule than its adjacent ones, low
values of k(x) in older ages tend to be followed by high values of k(x) in younger
ages, thereby resulting in a sequence of a dip and a peak….’’ (Horiuchi 1983. p. 81).
kx ðÞ¼ ln 5Mx=5Mx 5
     
=5: ð2Þ
Horiuchi’s k-statistic estimates the rate of increase in death rates with increasing
age. Constant values of k across the age spectrum would imply uniform exponential
increase in mortality rates with age. Irregularities in this age pattern identify
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123Table 1 Age, period and cohort effects
a for Hungarian male mortality
Beta Sigma Z-score Fitted logit
Model intercept -4.862 0.0132 -367.5
Row effect (midpoint of age groups)
12.5 -2.621 0.0377 -69.6 -7.483
17.5 -1.881 0.0359 -52.4 -6.742
22.5 -1.589 0.0360 -44.1 -6.450
27.5 -1.518 0.0361 -42.1 -6.380
32.5 -1.281 0.0361 -35.5 -6.142
37.5 -0.921 0.0361 -25.5 -5.782
42.5 -0.497 0.0361 -13.8 -5.358
47.5 -0.080 0.0361 -2.2 -4.942
52.5 0.316 0.0361 8.8 -4.545
57.5 0.702 0.0362 19.4 -4.160
62.5 1.079 0.0362 29.8 -3.782
67.5 1.456 0.0362 40.3 -3.405
72.5 1.849 0.0361 51.3 -3.012
77.5 2.275 0.0359 63.3 -2.587
82.5 2.709 0.0368 73.7 -2.153
Column effect (calendar years)
1955 -0.313 0.0299 -10.5 -5.175
1960 -0.293 0.0302 -9.7 -5.155
1965 -0.294 0.0303 -9.7 -5.155
1970 -0.175 0.0304 -5.8 -5.037
1975 -0.117 0.0304 -3.9 -4.979
1980 0.077 0.0303 2.6 -4.784
1985 0.188 0.0303 6.2 -4.674
1990 0.290 0.0302 9.6 -4.572
1995 0.321 0.0301 10.6 -4.541
2000 0.134 0.0300 4.5 -4.728
2005 0.183 0.0316 5.8 -4.678
Diagonal effect (median birth year of cohorts)
1873 0.781 0.1140 6.9 -4.081
1878 0.736 0.0817 9.0 -4.126
1883 0.693 0.0678 10.2 -4.169
1888 0.613 0.0597 10.3 -4.249
1893 0.555 0.0543 10.2 -4.306
1898 0.460 0.0504 9.1 -4.402
1903 0.376 0.0472 8.0 -4.486
1908 0.251 0.0447 5.6 -4.611
1913 0.142 0.0424 3.4 -4.720
1918 0.051 0.0404 1.3 -4.811
1923 0.110 0.0384 2.9 -4.752
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123atypical age groups. If such anomalies track with a particular cohort as they grow
older, we may speak of a high-mortality cohort in Horiuchi’s sense.
We replicated Horiuchi’s analysis using Hungarian 5Mx values. Consistent with
Horiuchi’s original hypothesis, Hungarian men born between 1901 and 1905 (who
reached puberty during the First World War) do appear to produce higher k(x)
values as they pass through successive ages in successive years. An even higher-
mortality cohort born from 1906 to 1910 reached puberty in Hungary during the
extremely hard years following the First World War, including the short-lived
Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun in 1920 with its cataclysmic effects
particularly in the rural population. Both these cohorts show Horiuchi’s hypoth-
esized mortality effects throughout their later lives. In addition, the birth cohort of
1925–1929 (males 20–24 in 1950, who thus entered puberty during the devastation
of the Second World War) had consistently-elevated values of k(x) in Hungary as
suggested by Compton and others. Finally, the birth cohort of 1940–1944 who
reached puberty during the difﬁcult period of the Hungarian Uprising in the mid-
1950s also may be a high-mortality cohort. The long-term cohort effect exists–but
can it explain the state socialist mortality syndrome?
Horiuchi described a high-mortality cohort as producing ‘‘a sequence of a dip and
a peak’’ in k(x) values. We can judge the cohort effect by comparing observed
mortality patterns to those that would obtain if we erase this dip and peak. This is
equivalent to estimating nMx for hypothetically affected cohorts as the geometric
mean of adjacent rates for younger and older age groups. From these calculations,
four or ﬁve percent of the observed 5M60 for German men in 1964 represents higher-
than-expected mortality, perhaps related as Horiuchi suggests to the long-term
impact of war on a cohort.
Table 1 continued
Beta Sigma Z-score Fitted logit
1928 0.166 0.0387 4.3 -4.696
1933 0.179 0.0387 4.6 -4.683
1938 0.171 0.0384 4.5 -4.691
1943 0.217 0.0379 5.7 -4.645
1948 0.132 0.0396 3.3 -4.729
1953 0.150 0.0414 3.6 -4.711
1958 0.096 0.0434 2.2 -4.765
1963 -0.134 0.0459 -2.9 -4.996
1968 -0.361 0.0489 -7.4 -5.223
1873 -0.664 0.0528 -12.6 -5.525
1978 -0.768 0.0583 -13.2 -5.629
1983 -0.935 0.0665 -14.1 -5.796
1988 -1.105 0.0807 -13.7 -5.966
1993 -1.911 0.1256 -15.2 -6.772
a Intrinsic Estimator effects from Stataapc_ieprocedure(see Yanget al. 2008) usingrectangular matrixof
logit (5Mx) rates for 1955–2005, ages 10–80; period mortality rate data from Human Mortality Database
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123Using the same logic, we adjust for the three exceptional Hungarian cohorts
noted above by geometric interpolation of new 5Mx values
4 in each year (linear
interpolation using the logarithms of rates from adjacent younger and older age
groups). How does this cohort effect translate into a possible explanation for rising
death rates among working-age men in Hungary? How much of the upswing in
mortality is accounted for as a cohort effect in the sense outlined above? We convert
both observed and adjusted 5Mx values to 5px survival probabilities and take
cumulative products of these 5px values to ﬁnd actual and adjusted probabilities of
surviving (or dying) in two age ranges––from 45 to 59 (the ages where the state
socialist mortality syndrome is most apparent) and from 60 to 74 (early retirement
ages during the state socialist epoch in eastern Europe). Figure 3 shows the impact
in each considered year of our adjustment for high-mortality cohorts on the
cumulative probability of dying between ages 45 and 59 and between ages 60 and
74. The hypothesized cohort effect does exist. Probabilities of dying drop by one or
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(http://www.mortality.org)
4 As illustrated in Fig. 3, we reach the same conclusion whether we use period-based or cohort-based
5Mx death rates from the Human Mortality Database.
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123two percentage points after we adjust the higher mortality of cohorts whose
adolescence came during extremely hard years. However, a shift of a percentage
point or two in these death rates explains hardly any of the more than 300% period
mortality increase observed as the state socialist mortality syndrome.
Moreover, these tiny effects of high-mortality cohorts were present throughout
the period in question at one age or another, affecting overall survival in similar
ways in every year considered. Both the older deductive Horiuchi method and Yang
and Land’s intrinsic estimator of age, period and cohort effects based on Stata’s
apc_ie procedure show that cohort effects have little or nothing to contribute to an
explanation of increases in the death rates of working-age men in the region. An
explanation for the alarming period rise in mortality must be sought elsewhere.
Explaining the State Socialist Mortality Syndrome
Early explanations of the state socialist mortality syndrome focused on the health
care delivery system (Deacon 1984; Feshbach 1982) and on lifestyles of the
population, particularly diet (Cooper and Schatzkin 1982), alcohol consumption
(Carlson and Watson 1990; Poikolainen 1995; Makala et al. 1997) and smoking
(Cooper 1985; Jozan 1986).
In fact, health care delivery problems probably were not responsible for the
working-age mortality increase (Ivanov and Echenique 2000). All explanatory
efforts (McQueen and Siegrist 1982; Marmot et al. 1984; Kunitz 1987) must begin
with the established clear age, sex and cause concentration, and must be consistent
with it. People most responsive to good health care and most vulnerable to ﬂaws in
health care delivery (that is, infants and old people) did not experience the rising
mortality trend. At the same time, people having least routine contact with health
care and least vulnerability to problems in the health care delivery system (adult
male workers) experienced most of the mortality increase. The health care
explanation fails to ﬁt these most basic facts of the phenomenon in question. Better
health care delivery did play a role in improvements in old-age survival in the
former state socialist countries after 1990 (Mesle ´ 2004; Rychtar ˇı ´kova ´ 2004) but
these old-age survival improvements are not the subject of the present analysis. We
are concerned with mortality trends at the heart of the working ages.
The lifestyle thesis (Cockerham 1997) is more plausible but more difﬁcult to
prove. This argument suggests that lifestyle changes produced mortality increase,
without suggesting why the lifestyle changes themselves occurred. Risk-increasing
behavior patterns have come to be recognized as manifestations of social
disorganization and stress (Cornia and Paniccia 2000). In order to explain the state
socialist mortality syndrome, then, one must identify special sources of such
disorganization and stress that appeared in these countries in particular, that affected
working-age men more than other population groups, and that produced effects
predominantly in certain cause of death categories. Cockerham et al. (2002)
suggested that lifestyle, health and survival may be linked to internalized passivity
and other attitudinal consequences of state socialist ideologies.
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123We expand on this idea by suggesting concrete structural changes in society that
might account for prevalence of such attitudes and concentration of mortality effects
among working-age men in particular. Building on existing studies, we offer a
macro-structural perspective linking shifts in development policy and labor force
structure to lifestyle change, health and mortality. We view policy initiatives of state
socialist governments as the underlying source of stressful living conditions,
pathological behavior and consequent mortality increase for men in the heart of the
working ages. This hypothesis does not contradict other explanations of the rising
mortality trend noted above. In fact, part of the usefulness of our exploratory macro-
structural model stems from its ability to link together these other perspectives,
particularly those related to speciﬁc causes of death, stress and lifestyle change
(Mesle ´ et al. 1993; Shkolnikov et al. 1998a; McKee and Shkolnikov 2001).
Cockerham (2005) has advocated closer attention to the possible links between
social structure and survival. We believe that our reduced-form model linking
social-structural conditions (Caselli 1991) directly to mortality trends is an
appropriate step in this direction, because many of the intervening causal linkages
already have been reasonably well established by existing research discussed above.
By providing hypotheses about why certain mortality patterns arose in certain times
and places, the present reduced-form model underpins other perspectives and
contributes to a more complete understanding of a dramatic episode in demographic
history. We test our explanation in two ways––ﬁrst through comparisons across
countries, and second through disaggregation of mortality patterns for occupational
groups within speciﬁc countries. In both cases, we ﬁnd patterns that would be
expected if our explanation of the state socialist mortality syndrome has merit.
Testing a Comparative Hypothesis
Changing shares of the working population engaged in broad categories of activity
reﬂect fundamental social-structural transformation (Smelser and Lipset 1967;
Chandler 1980). We distinguish the secondary sector of an economy including
heavy industry, construction, and electrical employment, from the primary sector
including farming, ﬁshing, and forestry. (Due to the ‘‘industrial’’ nature of mining,
we follow other researchers and count miners in the secondary sector even though
technically they work in the primary or extractive sector.) Both primary and
secondary sectors are distinguished from the tertiary sector including transportation,
commerce, personal service, clerical and managerial jobs, and professions.
We located labor force data by occupations for all considered countries at 5-year
intervals from 1960 to 2005 and also for earlier dates of 1930 and 1950 to establish
a baseline prior to the emerging consequences of state socialist development
policies in eastern Europe (see Appendix B in Supplementary Material). The
analysis omits women not only because the state socialist mortality syndrome
appears almost exclusively among men, but also because deﬁnitions of what
constitutes employment changed more for women (particularly with respect to
agriculture) over the course of the 20th century. While detailed occupational
deﬁnitions vary across countries, occupational assignment to primary, secondary
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123and tertiary sectors exhibits a high degree of standardization both across countries
and over time. In all cases, the three sectors are constructed by summing
consistently-deﬁned occupational subgroups as identiﬁed for various years in annual
Yearbooks of the International Labor Organization, Eurostat and the United
Nations. Consistency checks demonstrate that the ﬁgures reported in these sources
generally agree with one another. The International Standard Industrial Classiﬁca-
tion (ISIC) used consistently in all these sources provides a cross-national basis for
assigning occupational groups to the three basic sectors of every country’s labor
force.
The relative sizes of these structural sectors parallel levels of urbanization
(Shandra et al. 2003), GNP per capita, standards of living, and similar dimensions of
social and economic development. While social characteristics of individuals
including social class (Daric 1951; Pamuk 1985; Klinger 1987; Mare 1990;
Feinstein 1993; Valkonen 1993); education (Kunst and Mackenbach 1994; Preston
and Elo 1995; Shkolnikov et al. 1998b); or rural versus urban residence (Vielrose
1984; Jozan 1986) can provide powerful descriptors of mortality differences, the
distribution of these characteristics of individuals stems from the underlying
structure and relative size of the basic productive sectors of an economy (Stocks
1938; Smelser and Lipset 1967). We examine two orthogonal measures of the
relative size of these labor force sectors: the ratio of secondary-sector to tertiary-
sector jobs (S/T), and the ratio of both of these sectors combined to the primary
sector of the economy ((S ? T)/P).
European Sub-Regions for Comparative Analysis
The twentieth century witnessed fundamental structural transformation of European
countries. Moore (1945, p. 17) described the continent in terms of an urban-
industrial core in the northwest ringed by a less-developed periphery in the east and
south–a demarcation that is re-emerging in the 21st century and that as illustrated
below continues to capture statistically signiﬁcant and important economic and
demographic contrasts within Europe
5:
If one were to draw a circle on a map of Europe, with a center in the North Sea
off the English coast and with a radius of some 800 miles, the arc dividing the
European continent would approximate the boundary line between the
relatively prosperous industrial economies of the North and West and the
5 Changing national boundaries produce some variation in the list of countries. The reuniﬁcation of
Germany reduced the number of countries in the core by one, but since we concentrate on Europe’s
periphery this has little effect on our results. The split of Czechoslovakia into Slovakia and the Czech
Republic increased the number of countries in the state socialist periphery, but we recombine labor force
and mortality ﬁgures for the two new states and work with a single distribution for all of the former
Czechoslovakia even after the formal separation. A similar concatenation of data for successor states of
the former Yugoslavia also was attempted, though there is less certainty about some of the data used in
this Yugoslav reconstruction. For the three most recent dates in our series we experimented with the
alternative of including data for Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia separately (with other fragments of the
former Yugoslavia omitted). These alternative lists of countries do not yield different substantive results
in any signiﬁcant respect.
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123relatively underdeveloped and predominantly agrarian economies of the South
and East. (Moore 1945, p. 17).
Core countries inside Moore’s circle (Denmark, France, Germany, the UK,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland) already had experienced considerable
contraction of agriculture by the early twentieth century. They clearly differed as a
group from countries outside the circle (Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece,
Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Yugoslavia) in levels of manpower
distributed across sectors of the economy. Data were not available for Albania for
most years, nor for the former Soviet Union for the early postwar period, so neither
of these countries appear in this analysis.
Several countries are split by Moore’s circle. Assessing the level and trend of
urban-industrial development in these countries individually, two (Austria and
Sweden) can be assigned to the core at mid-century. The others (Czechoslovakia,
Italy and Norway) should be grouped with the periphery, though a more reﬁned
model would assign the Czech Republic (inside Moore’s circle) to the core and
Slovakia (outside the circle) to the periphery as of 1950. Additionally, some
countries that fall completely inside the circle, notably Ireland, clearly must be
shifted from core to periphery in terms of urban-industrial status as of mid-
century.
The Retreat from Agriculture: Uniformity in Europe’s Periphery
Moore’s distinction between Europe’s core and periphery captures an enduring and
statistically signiﬁcant contrast in the share of men working in primary-sector
occupations (agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing). In 1960, for example, 40% of men in
periphery countries worked in primary occupations while only 16% of men in core
countries held such jobs. By 2005, these percentages had declined to 11 and 4%
respectively, still a statistically signiﬁcant difference. Most of the variance across
Europe in ‘‘percent primary’’ is captured in all years by this core-periphery contrast,
which remained statistically signiﬁcant (p\0.01) for all years considered.
All state socialist countries with the exception of the German Democratic
Republic appeared in Europe’s periphery. For this reason and because the exodus
from agriculture produced much larger sectoral shifts in the labor force of periphery
countries, remaining analyses concentrate on Europe’s periphery countries.
Including core countries un-balances the research design with respect to the state-
socialist/non-state-socialist contrast, and also would mix together countries at quite
different stages of development.
Proportions of men with primary-sector jobs did not vary signiﬁcantly between
state-socialist and non-state-socialist regions of Europe’s periphery in any
considered year, although the collapse of former state-socialist economies after
1990 hit their agricultural sectors particularly hard. All European periphery
countries essentially underwent the 20th-century exodus from agriculture together
as a homogenous region. State socialist economic policy did not accelerate the ﬂow
out of agricultural employment, beyond that seen in market capitalist countries of
the periphery with their roughly matching proportions employed in agriculture at
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123mid-century. This homogeneity in ‘‘percent primary’’ throughout Europe’s periph-
ery allows us to concentrate on comparisons of the sectoral distribution of the
remaining male labor force outside the primary sector.
Contrasts in the Ratio of Secondary to Tertiary Sector Workers
State socialist development policies mainly inﬂuenced the destination of workers
leaving agriculture, affecting the balance between the secondary and tertiary sectors
and, we believe, producing changes that induced stress and self-destructive behavior
for working-age men, particularly in certain occupations. Kornai (1959; 1982; 1992)
succinctly summarizes how state socialist economies gradually became more and
more ‘‘bottom-heavy,’’ concentrating in the primary production processes, produc-
ing less and less ﬁnal consumer output from more and more raw material inputs
(Carlson and Bernstam 1992). As a predictable corollary of the gradual settling of
the economy toward primary extractive and low-level manufacturing at the expense
of consumable output, the service sector in state socialist economies atrophied by
comparison with the market capitalist countries of Europe’s periphery. As workers
left agriculture, state socialist planners and the momentum of state socialist
economic evolution steered them toward heavy industrial jobs rather than service
occupations (Conner 1991). A ratio of secondary-sector to tertiary-sector employ-
ment in each country’s labor force captures this development contrast at various
points during the century.
At mid-century the labor force effects of distinctive development policies had not
yet appeared in state socialist countries. Figure 4 shows the ratio of secondary-
sector to tertiary-sector jobs (the S/T ratio) for countries in Europe’s periphery,
regressed on a simple state-socialist versus market-capitalist dichotomy in
successive years. This dichotomy was not a signiﬁcant predictor of the S/T ratio
in either 1930 or 1950, conﬁrming the homogeneity of Europe’s periphery prior to
the advent of the state socialist epoch.
Starting in the 1960s, however, the S/T ratio shot up dramatically throughout
the state socialist half of Europe’s periphery. At the same time, in the market
capitalist periphery countries this ratio began to fall soon after mid-century (just
as it did in the mostly market capitalist European core countries). Both these
trends are illustrated in Fig. 4. While the state socialist versus market capitalist
dichotomy captured less than 2% of all variation in the S/T ratio in 1950, this
single coefﬁcient using a single degree of freedom already captured about 41% of
all variation in the ratio by 1960, and nearly 80% of all variation by 1985. The
predictive power of this dichotomy then dropped dramatically after the collapse of
state socialist governments in 1990, though remaining signiﬁcant through 2005.
The contrast in S/T ratios between state socialist and market capitalist countries in
Europe’s periphery appeared despite their great similarity noted above in the
transition out of agriculture, making them reasonable approximations of an
experimental and a control group of countries, respectively. The experimental
condition present in the former group but absent in the latter group was state
socialist development policy.
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What do development policy and labor force structure have to do with mortality?
We suggest that forced rapid expansion of heavy industry and restrictions on the
service sector created a highly anomic environment for the many predominantly
male workers leaving agriculture. Volgyes (1980, p. 443) succinctly described the
case of Hungary as it witnessed the largest proportionate occupational shift in the
region from agriculture to industrial employment, followed in succeeding years by
the largest proportionate increase in death rates for middle-aged men.
6 During this
period of rapid economic transformation between 1950 and 1965, the Hungarian
labor force included 700,000 people who commuted back and forth from villages to
urban employment daily and anther 450,000 who commuted weekly or less often.
The ‘‘black trains’’ that carried them to and from the villages were notorious scenes
of mass drunkenness and general suspension of the conventions of ordinary daily
life. Notably, in the beginning of the 1950s most of the commuters were middle-
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Fig. 4 Ratio of secondary/tertiary jobs. State socialist versus market capitalist countries in Europe’s
periphery. Source: OLS regression of ratio of men in secondary versus tertiary occupations on region
(data from Appendix Table B in Supplementary Material). State Socialist countries in the European
periphery include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. After the
breakup of Czechoslovakia we recombine Slovak and Czech data weighted by population to reconstruct
rates for a consistent territorial unit. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, we experimented with alternative
inclusion of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, and with reconstructing synthetic Yugoslav data from these
three components. Market Capitalist countries in the European periphery include Finland, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Spain. This classiﬁcation applies to all subsequent ﬁgures
6 We also note in this connection that the state socialist country with the smallest shift from agricultural
to industrial employment, the German Democratic Republic, also showed the smallest increase in
working-age male mortality.
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123aged men (Volgyes 1980, p. 449). Not surprisingly, then, mortality increases
occurred in rural as well as urban areas, since many rural residents were actually
commuting to and working in the new urban industrial districts (Andorka and
Harcsa 1983).
In the case of Hungary and her state socialist neighbors approximating an
experimental group, these labor force movements responded largely to push factors.
By contrast, in the market capitalist countries of the European periphery such as
Finland, Greece, Spain or Italy approximating a control group, manpower ﬂows of
similar magnitude responded to pull factors from spontaneous growth of the service
sector as well as creation of new industrial jobs.
Organized state socialist expansion of factory employment quickly outpaced the
ability of the social environment to assimilate the new factory workers. The service
sector as a whole was severely constrained by state socialist development policy––
in Czechoslovakia this sector of the labor force actually shrank in absolute terms in
the immediate postwar period, even as industry expanded rapidly. Migrants who
eventually escaped the disruptions of long-term mass commuting lived in vast,
anonymous clusters of identical multistorey apartment buildings. The Hungarians
called them ‘‘lakoteleps,’’ literally archipelagos of apartments rising out of the older
urban sea around them, but the architectural form is familiar throughout all the
countries of the state socialist bloc. Service facilities in these vast anonymous hives
were standardized, elementary, and state-owned and operated. Working-age male
migrants entering this new social landscape found themselves structurally isolated
both at home and at work. The social controls of village life disappeared. Anomie
generated by state socialist development policies focused self-destructive behavior
on men in the middle working ages and transformed them into a special risk group
for rising death rates.
Mortality Trends Correlate with LF Structure in Europe’s Periphery
Just as the dichotomy of state socialist versus market-capitalist countries within
Europe’s periphery became a very powerful predictor of labor force differences in
the second half of the twentieth century, this same dichotomy also became a
powerful predictor of diverging death rates among men in the heart of the working
ages.
7 Figure 5 shows no signiﬁcant difference in death rates distinguishing these
regions from each other as late as 1960. During the remainder of the century,
however, death rates for working-age men declined throughout the market capitalist
half of the periphery while death rates increased rapidly throughout the state
socialist half. This statistically signiﬁcant contrast peaked shortly after the collapse
of the state socialist governments, and then gradually began to fade away in the
decade that followed.
The contrast in mortality trends between the state socialist and market capitalist
halves of Europe’s periphery resembles the contrast shown in Fig. 4 for divergent
7 All probabilities of dying, 15q45, result from converting observed central mortality rates 5Mx into
survival probabilities 5px for ﬁve-year age groups, multiplying together all 5px values in the relevant age
range, and then subtracting the result from unity to estimate a cumulative 15q45 probability of dying.
These cumulative probabilities are shown in Appendix Table C in Supplementary Material.
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123occupational trends in the same regions, except that Figs. 4 and 5 taken together
suggest a lag of some years for emergence of the state-socialist mortality syndrome
following the appearance of the S/T ratio contrast between regions. A lag of up to a
decade from the time that state socialist development policies ﬁrst produced a
distinctive secondary/tertiary overload, to accumulating social and behavioral
consequences, and ﬁnally to the outcome of rising death rates, seems plausible.
The surface appearance of a parallel between structural labor force changes and
subsequent mortality trends suggests a more rigorous statistical model to test the
association across time between these phenomena. The ﬁrst step in this process
more rigorously assesses the link between mortality trends and the state socialist/
market capitalist dichotomy in the European periphery. We regress death rates on
this dichotomy for countries in Europe’s periphery between 1960 and 2005,
accounting for country-speciﬁc inﬂuences through a ﬁxed-effects panel regression
design. That is, in addition to the state socialist/market capitalist dichotomy, our
predictors also include a measure of each country’s death rate at a previous time.
Formula 3a shows the period probability of dying between ages 45–60 at time
t ? n as a function of the equivalent probability of dying n years earlier and a zero/
one variable identifying state socialist periphery countries:
15qtþn
45 ¼ a þ b1 15qt
45
  
þ b2 ss ðÞ þ e; ð3aÞ
where ss = 1 for state socialist countries and ss = 0 for market capitalist countries,
t represents time, and q is the probability of dying. The coefﬁcient for the ﬁxed-
effects lagged qx term on the right side in Eq. 3a dominates ﬁxed-effects panel
regression models and is generally substantively uninteresting. Models including
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Fig. 5 Working-age male mortality (15q45). State socialist versus market capitalist countries in Europe’s
periphery. Source: OLS regression of 15q45 on region, as for Fig. 4
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123such lagged dependent variables also yield absurdly high estimates of explained
variance dominated by the relative stability of the dependent variable across time, so
realistic estimates of the explanatory power of the other independent variables in the
model are less obvious. We prefer to transform this lagged ﬁxed-effects model into
an equivalent change-score model with all the same information, by shifting the
survival probability at the earlier time point to the left side of the equation as in
Formula 3b:
15qtþn
45   15qt
45 ¼ a þ b ss ðÞ þ e: ð3bÞ
Table 2 presents results of two OLS regression models considering mortality change
ﬁrst over a 5-year period and then over a 10-year period. In each case we regress
observed mortality changes in four age ranges on the state socialist dummy variable
across countries and years, as shown in Table 2.
The 5-year models include observations for all European periphery countries at
5-year intervals from 1960 to 2000. (The requirement of two mortality estimates
5 years apart for the dependent change-score variable means that 2005 is not
considered as a value for time t, although 2005 death rates are included in the
calculations when t is year 2000.) For the same reason, the 10-year models include
values of t at 5-year intervals from 1960 to 1995.
The negative intercepts of these models estimate the average change in 15qx (a
slight decline for each 15-year age range) over considered years in market capitalist
periphery countries. (When ss = 0 the b term drops out of Formula 3.) The fact that
the generally positive beta coefﬁcients for the state socialist dummy variable often
exceed the magnitude of these intercepts (yielding a positive rather than negative
result when intercept and beta coefﬁcient are combined in each model) illustrates
the rising rather than declining trend in 15qx characteristic of the state socialist
mortality syndrome. These panel regression results conﬁrm the impression
emerging from Fig. 5 that the state socialist/market capitalist dichotomy captured
a signiﬁcant divergence of mortality trends in the two halves of the European
Table 2 State socialist/market capitalist dichotomy predicts mortality changes
Intercept b (state socialist) rb t (b)P r [t Adjusted R
2
Five-year change-score regression for 15q45 (n = 107)
D(15q15) -0.00013 -0.00009 9.44E-05 -0.99 0.322 -0.0001
D(15q30) -0.00034 0.00039 0.000225 1.74 0.085 0.0185
D(15q45) -0.00138 0.00224 0.000556 4.04 0.000 0.1251
D(15q60) -0.00547 0.00454 0.001533 2.96 0.004 0.0676
Ten-year change-score regression for 15q45 (n = 95)
D(15q15) -0.00023 -0.00016 0.00014 -1.20 0.234 0.0045
D(15q30) -0.00070 0.00099 0.00036 2.78 0.007 0.0663
D(15q45) -0.00307 0.00542 0.00091 5.95 0.000 0.2660
D(15q60) -0.01164 0.01048 0.00225 4.67 0.000 0.1796
Source: original panel regression calculations from data in Appendices in Supplementary Material
D 15qx ðÞ ¼ 15qtþn
x   15qt
x (equivalent to ﬁxed-effect lag with qx at time t on right side of equation)
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123periphery in the late 20th century, because the regression coefﬁcient for the state
socialist variable is highly signiﬁcant.
Since Fig. 4 creates an equally strong impression that the state socialist/market
capitalist dichotomy also captures a signiﬁcant divergence in labor force trends in
these same countries during the same decades, the next logical step is to replace the
state socialist dummy variable in Formula 3b with a direct measure of labor force
trends—that is, the ratio of secondary to tertiary workers in each economy at each
date. Table 3 shows that the beta coefﬁcients for the S/T ratios also are uniformly
positive in all considered age ranges and for both sets of models, indicating that
higher S/T ratios predicted more mortality increase (or less mortality decline) across
considered countries and years.
In both 5- and 10-year lag models the effect of the S/T ratio on mortality change
is not signiﬁcant for men 15–30 years old, but highly signiﬁcant for all older age
ranges. Both the t-scores and the adjusted R
2 values for these equations are strongest
for the 45–60 age range, where the state socialist mortality syndrome concentrated.
This result is hardly surprising, since the S/T ratio itself is strongly predicted by the
state socialist/market capitalist dichotomy.
Theﬁnalpieceofthispuzzle,then,istoincludeboththedirecteffectoftheS/Tratio
andthestatesocialist/marketcapitalistcontrastinthesamemodel.Forgoodmeasure,
we also include the (S ? T)/P ratio of non-primary to primary occupations, to
illustrate that this factor was generally unrelated to mortality trends throughout the
European periphery. Table 4 shows results of these multivariate change-score panel
regressions, concentrating on the 15q45 age range at the heart of the state socialist
mortality syndrome where preceding models showed the strongest effects.
This table reveals that whether we consider 5- or 10-year mortality changes, the
direct effect of the state socialist/market capitalist distinction seen in Table 2 is
almost completely explained in terms of the direct effect of the S/T ratio seen in
Table 3. In other words, changes in the ratio of secondary to tertiary sector workers
accounts for almost all of the effect of the dichotomy, leaving little or nothing to be
Table 3 Ratio of secondary to tertiary workers predicts mortality changes
Intercept b (S/T ratio) rb t (b)P r [t Adjusted R
2
Five-year change-score regressions (n = 107)
D(15q15) -0.00021 0.00003 0.00011 0.31 0.756 -0.0085
D(15q30) -0.00128 0.00094 0.00024 3.87 0.000 0.1157
D(15q45) -0.00433 0.00331 0.00060 5.55 0.000 0.2176
D(15q60) -0.01300 0.00801 0.00163 4.90 0.000 0.1771
Ten-year change-score regressions (n = 95)
D(15q15) -0.00032 0.00002 0.00016 0.15 0.879 -0.0104
D(15q30) -0.00238 0.00171 0.00038 4.49 0.000 0.1678
D(15q45) -0.00949 0.00711 0.00096 7.42 0.000 0.3624
D(15q60) -0.02541 0.01486 0.00236 6.29 0.000 0.2886
Source: original panel regression calculations from data in Appendices in Supplementary Material
D 15qx ðÞ ¼ 15qtþn
x   15qt
x (equivalent to ﬁxed-effect lag with qx at time t on right side of equation)
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123explained by other factors. Labor force change appears to be a necessary and
sufﬁcient condition for producing the state socialist mortality syndrome. The
(S ? T)/P ratio, measuring the extent of the exodus from agriculture, fails to explain
anything signiﬁcant about observed mortality trends in these decades.
We have shown, then, that not only does the state socialist/market capitalist
dichotomy capture an important divergence in mortality trends within developing
European countries, but that this mortality syndrome can be further speciﬁed as
related directly to the observed contrast in labor force trends between these two
halves of Europe’s periphery. All these facts and patterns are consistent with our
hypothesis that state socialist development policies constituted something like an
‘‘experimental condition’’ that affected living arrangements, behaviour, health, and
ultimately survival, particularly for men at the heart of the working ages.
Testing an Internal Disaggregative Hypothesis
Turning from international comparison to national case studies, a different
hypothesis also can be derived from the theoretical linkage of state socialist
development policy and rising working-age male mortality. If the shift of workers
from agricultural labor to service-starved industrial districts is the key to the
acquired frailty of this speciﬁc population group, then the mortality increase ought
to have been concentrated in certain segments of the population.
Speciﬁcally, nearly all of the rural–urban commuters and migrants made their
way into manual (blue-collar) occupations. Very few persons leaving village
agriculture moved into non-manual employment as doctors, lawyers, scientists or
government ofﬁcials. Therefore the mortality increase should have been concen-
trated among manual workers, leaving the non-manual workers who had not
experienced this wrenching alteration of their lives relatively immune to the
phenomenon.
Table 4 Ratio of secondary to tertiary workers explains state socialist effect on mortality
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t Pr[t
Five-year change-score regression for D15q45 (n = 107)
Intercept -0.00356 0.00121 -2.95 0.004
S/T ratio 0.00267 0.00092 2.91 0.004
(S ? T)/P ratio -0.00005 0.00009 -0.60 0.552
State-socialist 0.00058 0.00072 0.80 0.428
Ten-year change-score regression for D15q45 (n = 95)
Intercept -0.00605 0.00200 -3.03 0.003
S/T ratio 0.00459 0.00152 3.02 0.003
(S ? T)/P ratio -0.00028 0.00016 -1.72 0.090
State-socialist 0.00208 0.00124 1.68 0.097
Source: original panel regression calculations from data in Appendices in Supplementary Material
D 15qx ðÞ ¼ 15qtþn
x   15qt
x (equivalent to ﬁxed-effect lag with qx at time t on right side of equation)
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123This is precisely the case, as has been established in previous research. In both
Hungary (Madai 1980; Compton 1985; Carlson 1989; Jozan 1989) and Bulgaria
(Griva and Sugareva 1984; Golemanov et al. 1984; Minev et al. 1990; Carlson and
Tsvetarsky 1992) virtually all of the increase in working-age male mortality
occurred exclusively among manual workers. In both countries, non-manual earners
were essentially immune to the rising risk.
The results of these trends in Hungary are illustrated in Fig. 6. In 1960, when the
state socialist mortality syndrome had barely begun to appear, manual workers had
age-speciﬁc death rates almost identical to those for non-manual workers. Over the
next decade, a massive mortality surplus began to appear among older working-age
men in manual occupations, while death rates for non-manual workers in the same
ages remained virtually unchanged. By 1980 rising death rates spread downward to
younger working ages, mirroring expansion of social dislocations downward into
these same younger ages.
In almost identical fashion, working-age mortality for manual workers in
Bulgaria also increased as shown in Fig. 7, while for non-manual workers these
death rates hardly changed at all.
Similar results recently have appeared for Latvia and other selected areas of the
former Soviet Union that possess adequate statistics to examine these patterns
(Andreev et al. 2009). Again, mortality increases concentrated disproportionately
among blue-collar workers, leaving white-collar workers with little increase (or
even observed decreases) in death rates. Similarity of these results across countries
suggests that concentration of rising working-age mortality among manual workers
characterized the entire region, exactly as predicted by our explanation.
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123Conclusion
Occupational contrasts in mortality from several national case studies are consistent
with our hypothesis that state socialist development policy and its labor force
consequences helped to produce the state socialist mortality syndrome. International
comparative results for the state socialist and market capitalist halves of Europe’s
periphery also are consistent with the same hypothesis. Each approach provides
independent empirical support for our macro-structural explanation.
Of course, we do not claim to have ‘‘proved’’ that our suggested explanation is
true. We believe that simply establishing the basic plausibility of a new, systematic
structural-level framework for explaining these mortality trends is by itself a
valuable contribution to our understanding of one of the most arresting demographic
trends in the twentieth century. State socialist development policies emphasizing
industrial employment at the expense of the service sector created conditions that
appeared consistently in the right times and places to explain subsequent rises in
working-age male mortality, while countries and population groups not facing the
brunt of these policies show stability or even improvement in survival rates.
Doubtless there can be other tests of related hypotheses. One of the ways that an
exploratory hypothesis like ours can be valuable is in suggesting additional patterns
to investigate. For example, case studies might determine whether mortality
increases actually were concentrated among manual workers who did move from
agriculture, as opposed to those who lived and worked in the urban industrial milieu
all their lives. Information on place of birth, if available in death registration data,
would be critical to such an inquiry. If the industry/service employment ratio is an
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123important determinant of other, more proximate conditions in the lives of working
adults, then it also ought to be possible to ﬁnd the same pattern in other historical
settings. Analogous mortality patterns may have been generated by quite different
political and/or economic processes (Hammond and Hammond 1949; Roseﬁelde
1983; Matossian 1985; McCord and Freeman 1990; Abdala et al. 2000). Continued
future changes in the industry/service ratio also should have other implications for
survival trends.
Another important elaboration of this state socialist mortality syndrome thesis
should investigate causes of death. The case studies of Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia
and other regions in the former USSR noted above already provide some evidence
that mortality increases were concentrated in cause categories that are consistent
with this general thesis, but further investigation could strengthen or undermine the
argument. Further research also might follow the lead of Cockerham et al. (2002)
who have shown that more than a decade after the collapse of state socialism, people
more in favor of a return to the old Soviet state socialist system in the former Soviet
Union have more destructive health habits including problematic diet, lack of
exercise and consumption of toxins such as alcohol and tobacco.
Doubtless other kinds of hypotheses and empirical tests of them will occur to
others in the future. Even if the theoretical link proposed here might eventually
collapse under the weight of accumulated evidence, if it moves forward the search
for a better understanding of the determinants of human survival it will have served
its purpose.
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